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5 critical capabilities for 2019

5 critical capabilities for 2019

BY ROBERT JOHNSTON

We can add NASA to the list of recent federal cyber breach victims. The space agency disclosed in late December that hackers found their way into its servers in October 2018. While NASA is still investigating the extent of the breach, the agency knows the hackers accessed personal data of both former and current employees. Unfortunately, other agencies will surely find themselves in NASA’s shoes in 2019. Here’s why:

Cyber criminals know government IT pros have limited budgets that create resource challenges when it comes to securing a daunting array of technologies and data flows. This makes agencies at all levels of government target-rich environments for hackers. So, what’s the answer? How can government IT leaders take control of their data and reduce their vulnerability to bad actors in 2019?

The solution is straightforward, but multilayered. Government agency CIOs and CTOs need a hub-and-spoke system to collect and index data from all their IT touchpoints. These include network traffic, web servers, VPNs, firewalls, applications, hypervisors, GPS systems and pre-existing structured databases. For optimal cyber protection, all those data feeds should be run through an artificial-intelligence-authored security information and event management (SIEM) system equipped with machine-learning-powered analytics to identify anomalous and malicious patterns.

The hub-and-spoke approach should enable four critical capabilities: log/device management, analytics, account/system context and visualization of user privileges across an entire network. Here’s a walk-through of the capabilities and why they matter.

1. Log/device management: This piece should include unlimited and automated coverage of logs, devices and systems as well as integrated compliance management. It should also provide real-time event log management, Windows and Linux server management, cloud and on-premise ingest, secure and encrypted log management and log data normalization.

2. Analytics: Data today is too voluminous for human analysis, so using AI and machine learning to analyze large amounts of data makes the most sense. Agencies should look for a single platform that provides automated threat intelligence, real-time intrusion detection alerts, 24/7 network vulnerability assessment, and user and device context.

3. Account/system context: Speed is essential, so agencies should look for a system that provides one-click, automated risk reporting for auditors and decision-makers that takes minutes rather than days.

4. Visualized permissions: Because cybersecurity conditions and requirements quickly change, agencies need the ability to visualize privileged users and groups in real-time across the network in order to understand who can touch an agency’s data.

5. Long-term viability: Will an agency’s technology still be viable in one, two or five years? It’s an important question, but one that is often mistakenly answered with a yes. The era of on-premise architectures is over because they are flawed by design. Tied to the constraints of initial deployment, these systems are allergic to architecture migration, software redesign, advancements in analytic capabilities and new database implementation. In the cloud, however, organizations can develop a symbiotic relationship between the service they use and new cutting-edge technologies. With today’s cybersecurity threats, agencies need to be bigger, faster and stronger than the adversary, and the cloud gives them the opportunity to deploy the best solutions available.

The hub-and-spoke approach gives government agencies a fighting chance to keep data out of hackers’ hands. What used to be nice to have is now essential. There’s just too much at stake.

About the Author

Robert Johnston is the co-founder and CEO at Adlumin Inc.

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Healthcare IT: How to Take Control of Disparate Data Sources

 by 

Here’s what we know. The number of healthcare data breaches has trended steadily higher over the past decade, in part because cyber criminals know healthcare IT pros are distracted and juggling multiple priorities. From IoT to traditional Windows networks, healthcare is a huge hacking target because managing and securing the large array of technologies and multiple data flows is overwhelming.

Plus, resource-constrained healthcare organizations struggle to find enough qualified security personnel, time and budget to mount a consistently effective cyber defense. And, with the next big breach lurking, stakeholders are asking if it is possible for a hospital or health system to take control of its data and make itself less vulnerable to bad actors. The answer is “Yes” but it will take commitment and a seriousness of purpose to be effective.

The best strategy is a hub-and-spoke system that collects and indexes data from the numerous sources common in a healthcare setting. These include network traffic, Web servers, VPNs, firewalls, custom applications, application servers, hypervisors, GPS systems, and pre-existing structured databases. But this is only the first step because in today’s threat environment, even that array of capabilities won’t be enough. Healthcare organizations need to be on high alert in their cyber-protection game which begins by running all data feeds through an artificial-intelligence-authored security information and event management (SIEM) system. This needs to be equipped with machine-learning-powered analytics to identify anomalous and malicious patterns.

The next level of protection for healthcare CIOs, CTOs, IT and data management pros to implement is making sure their hub-and-spoke systems provide four critical capabilities: log/device management, world-class analytics, account/system context, and the ability to visualize preferences across their entire network. All of these capabilities can be secured by using one platform as we have done at Adlumin. Below is an in-depth review of each that every healthcare IT executive should follow:

  1. The log/device management piece should include unlimited log/device/system coverage, integrated compliance management (PCI DSS, HIPAA, SOX, FFEIC), automated log and device ingest, and critical server log management. It also needs to have, real-time event log management, Windows and Linux server management, cloud and on-premise ingest, secure and encrypted log management and log data normalization. Storage and processing are a commodity. The days of not being able to handle your production workload are over. Security vendors should not be asking for 90% of your budget to only solve 10% of your problems.
  2. For the analytics, find a single platform that provides automated threat intelligence, real-time intrusion detection alerts, 24/7 network vulnerability assessment, automatic analysis of firewall and VPN log data alongside network account data, automated anomaly interpretation and user and device context. There is simply just too much data for a human to analyze. Using artificial intelligence and machine learning to analyze large amounts of data so you don’t have to is the perfect remedy. So, drop your log management solution and replace it with a cloud-native SIEM.
  3. The account/system context should include risk management, visualization, and analysis, plus automated reporting for auditors and compliance. It should provide the ability to understand risk with one button click to enable decision making that takes minutes rather than days. And it should power compliance audit reports. With the power of a single click you should be able to understand risk and compliance this will make your response time and network security that much better over time.
  4. Finally, the ability to visualize privileged users and groups across the network reveals exactly who can touch a healthcare organization’s most sensitive data. Every healthcare IT executive needs to, identify the groups and individuals that have privilege on share drives, and show auditors actual account privilege in real-time. A picture tells a thousand words. Being able to visualize privilege within your environment lets you get your job done faster and take that 2-hour lunch break you so deserve!

Chaos and lack of focus make a healthcare IT operation a ready mark for bad actors. The hub-and-spoke system outlined above, with the additional capabilities, gives healthcare data pros a fighting chance to keep vital patient and employee data out of hackers’ hands.

Robert Johnston is the co-founder & chief executive officer at Adlumin, Inc., and is the cyber detective and strategic thinker who solved the Democratic National Committee hack during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. He can be reached at robert.johnston@adlumin.com (https://adlumin.com/@dvgsecurityand@adlumin

About Adlumin Inc.

Adlumin Inc. was founded in 2016 by Robert Johnson and Timothy Evans, experienced Marine Corps leaders, both spent time at the National Security Agency (NSA). Leveraging its principals’ extensive knowledge and experience in the cyber-security incident response, offensive, and defense arenas, Adlumin has developed a NEXGEN artificial intelligence SIEM platform that detects and confirms identity theft and allows its users to respond in real-time. Adlumin is a cost-effective Software as a Service (SaaS) solution designed to stop cyber intrusions and data breaches.

PRESS CONTACT
Timothy Evans
Adlumin Inc.
P: (571) 334-4777
E: timothy.evans@adlumin.com
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Dynamic Anomaly Detection Using Machine Learning

Dynamic Anomaly Detection Using Machine Learning

by:  Dr. Tim Stacey, Ph.D.

User Behavior Analytics is an incredibly hot field right now – software engineers and cybersecurity experts alike have realized that the power of data science can be harnessed to comb through logs, analyze user events, and target activity that stands out from the crowd. Previously the gold standard for this process was manual, based on exhaustive queries against large databases. These investigations also happened ex post facto, after the hack or the intrusion occurred to diagnose what actually happened.

At Adlumin, we’ve sought to create a proactive product that reduces the amount of intensive data work that a cybersecurity specialist needs to perform. We’ve had analytics in production since inception, but today we’d like to introduce a new product that will make finding new malicious activity even easier.

Our new Rapid User Behavior Alerts will pick up on novel user behavior in a range of event types, specifically targeting combinations of attributes or actions that have never been seen before on a network. These Rapid Alerts come out within seconds of the Adlumin platform receiving the data, notifying sysadmins that something unexpected has occurred on their network.

Importantly, we have tuned our new data science engine to have high tolerances for power users (eg. sysadmins) while triggering at lower tolerances for users that have a limited range of behaviors. This is a crucial aspect to reduce over-flagging on novel behavior. Our goal is to transmit high impact findings reliably and quickly and avoid spamming the end user with bad alerts.

Our analytics engine takes advantage of an auto-encoding neural network framework, finding the difference between previous and current modes of user behavior in a heavily non-linear space. By passing the event through a trained auto-encoder, we determine the reconstruction error of an incoming event – this is a measure the anomalous nature of a user’s actions. Since the anomalous characteristics of the incoming event are condensed to a single number, we can grade this number against a distribution of the user’s previous events to determine if this incoming event is truly different.

Our fast evaluation of incoming data is made possible with the assistance of AWS DynamoDB and AWS Lambda. Pre-trained user models live in our Dynamo tables—these models are quickly queried for each event, as we process thousands or hundreds of thousands of events per second. Our Lambdas evaluate the incoming data against the queried baseline and produce a threat score with an interpretation of what caused the threat. Our baselines are updated frequently on a schedule to account for the relatively fast drift in user behavior over time.

In the coming months, Adlumin will be rolling out analytics specifically targeted to log data, system behavior, and a more detailed analysis dependent on cold storage of data. Rapid User Behavior Alerts are the first line of defense as we develop a suite of analytics to protect your network from harm.

BIO: Dr. Tim Stacey is the Director of Data Science for Adlumin Inc, a cybersecurity software firm based in Arlington, VA. At Adlumin, his work primarily focuses on user behavior analytics. His experience includes designing analytics for Caterpillar, the RAND Corporation, and the International Monetary Fund. He holds a PhD from the University of Wisconsin Madison in computational chemistry.

 

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Adlumin Launches Seamless Turnkey Data Retention Service for Financial Institutions

Adlumin Launches Seamless Turnkey Data Retention Service for Financial Institutions

Snapshot 365 simplifies and automates PCI-DSS-required data storage.

ARLINGTON, VA. (PRWEB) NOVEMBER 01, 2018

Adlumin has launched an automated service called Snapshot 365 that allows financial institutions to instantaneously comply with data storage requirements. Snapshot 365 answers the need of financial institutios to store their firewall, security, and IT log data for the full 12 months, to comply with PCI-DSS requirements as well as FDIC and NCUA regulations.

Financial institutions face an increasingly alarming security environment in which hackers are breaching consumer data, ransomware attacks, and horror stories abound of data theft by disgruntled or terminated employees.

“Given that the average dwell time for the detection of threats is in excess of 200 days, Snapshot 365 provides a truly revolutionary addition to Financial Sector security and SIEM solution’s” said Adlumin Co-Founder and CEO Robert Johnston. “Snapshot 365 is more than an answer to regulatory requirements, it is a vital piece of a financial institution’s data security arsenal.”

Snapshot 365 gives customers access to three months of “hot” searchable encrypted data and nine months of “warm” encrypted data, all analyzed using Adlumin’s serverless artificial intelligence architecture. Snapshot 365 safely and securely stores data to ensure it is available to the bank or credit union at a moment’s notice.

Snapshot 365 uses a combination of hot and warm storage to lower the overall cost of the service. Typically, institutions can purge the data after a successful audit report is completed, then rely on the audit report to address any compliance questions that arise. In an audit, this kind of consistency can be the difference between passing and failing.

“A lot of banks and credit unions view data storage as a complicated task that they often avoid doing it, despite the regulatory requirements,” said Johnston. “That puts them at extreme risk of fines — or worse — should a breach occur. Snapshot 365 inexpensively automates the data storage process. You turn it on and it just works. No more risk, no more worry, no more hassle.”

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Adlumin Introduces New Integrations to its Market Leading Cloud-Native AI SIEM Platform


Adlumin Introduces New Integrations to its Market Leading Cloud-Native AI SIEM Platform

ARLINGTON, VA. (PRWEB) OCTOBER 24, 2018

Adlumin has raised the bar yet again in helping corporations secure sensitive data, by developing and introducing their first-ever cloud-native AI-powered security information and event management (SIEM) technology that is easy to integrate, easy to use, and very cost effective.

“In today’s threat environment, companies need more than just data. They must be able to track and search a variety of data points simultaneously and in real-time — which is simply not possible relying on human analysis,” explained Johnston. “That’s the beauty of our proprietary serverless SIEM. We combine the power of AI with the efficiency of the cloud to deliver unparalleled user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA) through a single pane of glass.”

Adlumin’s cloud-native AI collects and indexes data feeds from a comprehensive array of sources — including network traffic, web servers, VPNs, firewalls, custom applications, application servers, hypervisors, GPS systems, and preexisting structured databases — then runs sophisticated analytics and machine learning to determine what is anomalous and what is malicious. Adlumin’s SIEM integrations increase the value and efficacy of platforms such as Cisco, Carbon Black, Palo Alto Networks and many others.

“Adlumin makes the power of SIEM technology accessible and affordable,” said Co-Founder and CEO Robert Johnston. “Our cloud data capabilities bring the most cost efficient SIEM to the marketplace, freeing companies to benefit from the technology without needing a Ph.D. on staff to operate it. Even a young college graduate can operate this, because we use AI to do the heavy lifting of comparing across data points.”

This technology is especially needed by medium-sized and enterprise businesses,, which today face a growing array of cyber threats yet often have budget constraints that limit their ability to protect themselves.

About Adlumin
Adlumin was founded literally to “add light” to customers’ cyber security processes by helping them comply, detect, prioritize, and respond in real-time. Adlumin revolutionizes the way corporations secure sensitive data, by providing real-time visibility and analysis using machine learning and industry expertise from the world’s finest investigators and the U.S. intelligence community.

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Running Linux Systems in the Enterprise is Just Good Business

Connected World

Running Linux Systems in the Enterprise is Just Good Business

By Milind Gangwani

The prevalence for running Linux systems in the enterprise is increasing, typically depended on for running business operations software, web applications, cloud technology, internet of things devices, and core banking software. However, these systems are often the most neglected in security. Furthermore, custom Linux variants pose a significant issue for many customers. Custom Linux variants can respond very differently than traditional core Linux variants like Ubuntu, Red Hat, and Fedora; because of the high variability across kernel and builds the IT staff often leaves these systems unattended despite their crucial role in IT security-based Infrastructure.

As the preferred operating system for cloud deployments, Adlumin typically sees configurations with either Debian and Fedora as the variant of choice. Even container technology, like Docker, utilizes a Linux Kernel.

While Linux, as an operating system, is used to manage applications, conduct computing, and process large volumes of data, organizations struggle to easily monitor and analyze activity transactions.

Here at Adlumin, we have designed and developed a Linux daemon that feeds into our cloud-native SIEM (Security Information & Event Management) technology. Our Linux forwarder can be installed on any of the version of Debian or Fedora. To state it more accurately, it can be deployed on Fedora version 6.0 and Debian version 6.0 onwards, till the latest release. These base builds include Linux variants like Red Hat, Ubuntu, CentOS, and many more.

The installation of the forwarder is incredibly simple and takes just minutes. Upon installation it scans resident Kernel libraries looking for the correct setup procedures and it requires no intermediate dependencies to run seamlessly.  The daemon configuration is such that, even if a sudo/root user were to tamper with the process, the daemon would restart silently.

The forwarder uses a simple but effective approach.  Initial information is collected ‘/etc/os-release’ or ‘/etc/system-release’ paths. Subsequently all account, privilege, share, and permission data sets are collected from a variety of sources. This permits Adlumin to make an excellent assessment of risk by understanding what access points may be vulnerable to attack.

The Linux forwarder was developed using Googles Golang programming language. GoLang is known for its lightweight footprint and efficiency. It can be universally deployed anywhere without a machine interpreter.

Using a hybrid combination of the Golang operating system API, traditional API’s, and external binary inclusion Adlumin now can provide a lightweight forwarder that is effective on almost any Linux operating system version.

This Linux forwarder is part of our holistic intrusion detection approach by monitoring, reporting, and analyzing user and entity behavior.  The underlying technology and analytics is designed to traverse windows, Linux, and network device you can dream of. Using data points from all sources to instantaneously produce a conclusion.

Biography:  Milind Gangwani is a full-stack developer at Adlumin and has been in development for more than 10 years. Prior to joining Adlumin, Milind was a senior developer at SalientCRGT at the US Patent office. He has a master’s degree in computer vision from Rochester Institute of Technology.

 

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Adlumin Secure Device Data Collector Application

Adlumin Syslog Collector Screenshot

Adlumin Secure Data Collector Application

August 28, 2018
By: Dan McQuade

One of the challenges we face as a cloud-based SIEM platform is the process of collecting data from a variety of disparate sources on a local network, and securely transmitting that data into our platform over the internet. These sources can include end-user PCs, Windows/UNIX/Linux servers, firewalls, VPN servers, network security monitoring devices, and more. For traditional end-user desktops and servers, Adlumin has addressed this problem with custom applications that monitor activity and securely transmit the data into our platform for analysis. For hardware devices such as firewalls and VPN servers, the problem is a bit more challenging, as there is usually no easy way to install custom software on such devices.A common feature amongst firewalls and other network-based hardware devices, is the ability to forward log data in syslog format to an external source. One of the benefits of dealing with syslog data is that it usually conforms to one of a handful of standards (RFC 3164, RFC 5424, etc.), and can therefore be easily parsed for analysis on the receiving end. However, the transmission generally occurs over TCP or UDP as unencrypted plain-text, and therefore transmitting such data over the public internet to the Adlumin platform is not an option. We needed a way to capture syslog data, and securely forward it into our platform for analysis. Enter the Adlumin Syslog Collector.

The Adlumin Syslog Collector is a custom application written in Python, which runs on a Linux-based virtual machine as a systemd service. The application listens on numerous pre-defined TCP and UDP ports, securely forwarding all incoming data over an encrypted TLS connection to the Adlumin platform for collection and analysis. Once ingested, syslog data is immediately available to be viewed and searched through using the Adlumin dashboard. Powerful visualizations are generated in real-time, giving users the ability to spot patterns and identify threats as they occur.

We designed the syslog collector with ease-of-use in mind, and in less than 15 minutes it can be fully up and running, ready to receive and forward data. It offers a user-friendly GUI, which allows it to be installed and configured even if the end-user isn’t proficient with Linux or the command line. The application is shipped as a single-file OVA (Open Virtualization Format Appliance) and is capable of running under most modern hypervisors (VMWare, VirtualBox, etc.). The configuration required to deploy the Adlumin Syslog Collector is very straightforward. The only steps required to get up and running are as follows:

  1. Load the OVA into the hypervisor and boot the system
  2. Change the default password
  3. Enter the client-specific Adlumin endpoints
  4. Configure the network interface
  5. Set the time zone on the virtual machine
  6. Verify the configuration
  7. Route syslog traffic to the forwarder

Once the initial setup is completed, no further intervention is required of the end-user. As long as the virtual machine is running, the application will securely forward all received data to the Adlumin platform. Out of the box, the application has eight built-in listeners for a variety of syslog data sources. These include: firewall, VPN, network security device (i.e. FireEye NX), endpoint security, Carbon Black, and two miscellaneous listeners. Each listener resides on a unique TCP or UDP port (specified in the documentation). Support for additional listeners and data sources is constantly being added, based on requests and feedback we receive from our clients.

To keep up with the dynamic threat landscape, modern SIEMs must be able to interpret massive amounts of log data from a wide variety of applications and devices that reside on an enterprise network. Traditional on-premise SIEMs can become overloaded with this data, and it may take the user hours to sort through it all. The Adlumin Syslog Collector filters and normalizes syslog data in our cloud-based platform at unparalleled speed, in order to paint a more complete picture of the activities occurring on a network and to alert on anomalous events as they occur in real-time.


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Enterprise-Level Data Science with a Skeleton Crew

Enterprise-Level Data Science with a Skeleton Crew

Originally published on datascience.com

“Data science is a team sport.” As early as 2013, this axiom has been repeated to articulate that there is no unicorn data scientist, no single person that can do it all. Many companies have followed this wisdom, fielding massive data science operations.

But more often than not, a big data science team isn’t an option. You’re a couple techy people trying to make waves in a bigger organization, or a small shop that depends on analytics as a part of the product.

My company falls into the second camp—at Adlumin, we’re a small team that has a big enterprise-level problem: cybersecurity. We use anomaly detection to monitor user behavior, looking for malicious activity on a network. Because we need to catch intrusions quickly, we perform streaming analytics on the information we receive.

Two things allow us to succeed: building on the cloud and thoroughly testing our analytics. Cloud isn’t specifically for small teams, but it helps to compete with and exceed bigger competitors. Testing is our failsafe. By implementing useful tests on our analytics, we can have assurance that the models will perform when they’re released.

Below are three principles that I’ve distilled into part of a playbook for doing data science at scale with a small team.

1. The cloud is your friend.

One issue in data science is the disconnect between development and deployment. In a big company, the data scientists often have the luxury of creating something that won’t scale and then punting deployment to the engineers. Not so on our skeleton crew.

Enter the world of the cloud. By moving most of your dev ops to a cloud-based platform, you can work on getting the analytics stood up without any of the tricky details of database management or orchestration.

For streaming analytics, two great options exist: serverless and container based.

Serverless analytics involve spinning up a process when data comes in, doing some number crunching, and then disappearing. This can be a cost saving measure because the server doesn’t have to be maintained to wait for new data. However, the analytics must be fairly lightweight—most serverless offerings will time out long before you can load up a big model.

Containers are more permanent. We still can have live, streaming analytics, but now a container will load the model and keep it ready to receive data all the time. This can be a useful configuration if the model is going to be large, the library requirements many, or the uptime constant. This is also a preferred method if you have a handful of workhorse models for all of your analytic needs.

At Adlumin, we aren’t drawing on heavy libraries and we need to evaluate many (>5000) models quickly, so a modification of the serverless option makes up the basis of our anomaly detection.

The beginning of our method starts by building a baseline model for each one of our users. This is set up on a weekly interval. We probe a large data store for user behavior data, build baselines (which are small weight matrices), and then store them in a fast NoSQL database.

To process live data, we collect user data in sessions, which are event streams broken into chunks. Once a session appears to be complete, we spin up a serverless process to read the session, query for the appropriate baseline, and evaluate the two together. A result gets passed to another database and the process dies, ready for the next session.

2. Get something that works, then test it.

Sometimes testing seems more like a necessary evil. The best test might be the biggest hurdle when you’re on a tight deployment timeline.

But you need to find a way to evaluate whether your analytics are returning sensible results. Again, there are options:

  1. Real testing: Someone has imparted you with a cherished “golden” data set. This data contains ground truth labels, and you can perform classic train-tests splits, evaluate metrics, and other rigorous testing.
  2. Natural testing: Instead of being handed a data set, you can construct a ground truth from information external to your dataset. Join multiple data sets, manipulate metadata, or come up with another way to create a target.
  3. Artificial testing: Make a data set! This is a great inclusion into a testing suite, even if you have either the first or second option. You can create small data that will be evaluable every time you push new code.
  4. Feel testing: Run your model on live data and observe the output. Does the output meet your or the users’ expectations? You want to know if you have a really noisy model, a quiet model, or something in between.

At Adlumin, we have some data that reflects ground truth. For instance, saved penetration testing data reflects what a single type of an attack might look like. This is a great opportunity to test out our models, but attacks can take a number of forms, which creates an upper bound on the utility of this data.

Additionally, we know a little bit about the users we monitor. For instance, many companies create service accounts to perform the same tasks, day in and day out. We test to see if we routinely flag these accounts, and if so, the models need to be heavily reworked.

Finally, we created our own data set, complete with data that reflects both normal and anomalous behavior. We integrated this into a test before model deployment.

3. Orchestrate a lot of things at once.

One additional item that makes this all work is orchestration. Orchestration assists our automated tasks by arranging the code and managing all of the tasks.

We use a continuous integration system that puts all scripts into the right places (e.g. updating the script for serverless processes, and pushing new code to the baseline generation server) when we push any new code. We don’t have to scp anything into a server—the push to our code repository covers everything.

In addition, tests will automatically fire when code gets pushed. If the tests fail, the code won’t be updated and erroneous stuff won’t get deployed.

Updating the whole operation piecemeal would be tedious and error-prone. There are too many moving parts! Orchestration also allows us to move quickly. As soon as we develop new code, it can be run against tests and put into the right place without having to consider any additional steps. This frees up time and also headspace formerly preoccupied with deployment details.

There are many other aspects to making streaming analytics work in a small team, but these are three important ones. Doing enterprise-level data science with a skeleton crew can be challenging, but it is rewarding and fun!

 

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ACTIVE DEFENSE AND “HACKING BACK”: A PRIMER

ACTIVE DEFENSE AND “HACKING BACK”: A PRIMER

In the lead piece in this package, Idaho National Lab’s Andy Bochman puts forth a provocative idea: that no amount of spending on technology defenses can secure your critical systems or help you keep pace with hackers. To protect your most valuable information, he argues, you need to move beyond so-called cyber hygiene, the necessary but insufficient deployment of security software and network-monitoring processes.

ABOVE: Forts like HM Fort Roughs were marvels of defensive engineering at the time: capable of being brought to sea, sunk in place, and fully operational within 30 minutes.

Bochman lays out a framework that requires switching your focus from the benefits of efficiency to the costs. Ideas that were once anathema — unplug some systems from the internet, de-automate in some places, insert trusted humans back into the process — are now the smart play.

But they’re not the only play. Another that’s gaining attention is “active defense.” That might sound like Orwellian doublespeak, but it’s a real strategy. It involves going beyond passive monitoring and taking proactive measures to deal with the constant attacks on your network.

There’s just one problem: As active defense tactics gain popularity, the term’s definition and tenets have become a muddy mess. Most notably, active defense has been conflated with “hacking back” — attacking your attackers. The approaches are not synonymous; there are important differences with respect to ethics, legality, and effectiveness.

Active defense has a place in every company’s critical infrastructure-protection scheme. But to effectively deploy it, you need a proper understanding of what it is — and that’s tougher to come by than you might expect.

We enlisted two of the foremost experts on the topic to help us proffer an authoritative definition of active defense and give you a fundamental understanding of how to deploy it.

Dorothy Denning was an inaugural inductee into the National Cyber Security Hall of Fame. A fellow of the Association for Computing Machinery and a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, she has written several books on cybersecurity, including Information Warfare and Security. She also coauthored a landmark paper on active defense, which states, “When properly understood, [active defense] is neither offensive nor necessarily dangerous.”

Robert M. Lee is a cofounder of Dragos, an industrial security firm. He conducted cyber operations for the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command from 2011 to 2015. In October 2017 his firm identified the first known malware written specifically to target industrial safety systems — in other words, its sole purpose was to damage or destroy systems meant to protect people. (The malware had been deployed that August against a petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia, but the attack failed.) When asked about active defense, Lee sighs and asks flatly, “How are you defining it?” You can tell he’s had this conversation before. The number of people co-opting the term seems to have wearied him, and he’s happy to help bring clarity to the idea.

The following FAQ primer draws on interviews with Denning and Lee.

What exactly is active defense, also known as active cyber defense?

It depends on whom you ask. The term has almost as many definitions as it does citations. NATO defines active defense this way: “A proactive measure for detecting or obtaining information as to a cyber intrusion, cyber attack, or impending cyber operation or for determining the origin of an operation that involves launching a preemptive, preventive, or cyber counter-operation against the source.”

A solid working definition can be found in Denning’s paper with Bradley J. Strawser, “Active Cyber Defense: Applying Air Defense to the Cyber Domain:Active cyber defense is a direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of cyber threats against friendly forces and assets.”

That sounds like offense, but Lee and Denning note that it describes a strictly defensive action — one taken in reaction to a detected infiltration. Lee argues that there’s a border distinction: Active defense happens when someone crosses into your space, be it over a political boundary or a network boundary. But Denning says that’s probably too simple, and below we’ll see a case in which the line is blurred. Lee says, “Most experts understand this, but it’s important to point out, especially for a general audience. You are prepared to actively deal with malicious actors who have crossed into your space. Sending missiles into someone else’s space is offense. Monitoring for missiles coming at you is passive defense. Shooting them down when they cross into your airspace is active defense.”

Can you give some other examples?

Denning says, “One example of active cyber defense is a system that monitors for intrusions, detects one, and responds by blocking further network connections from the source and alerting the system administrator. Another example is taking steps to identify and shut down a botnet used to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.” It’s the verbs “responds” and “shut down” that make these instances of active defense. An example of passive defense, in contrast, is an encryption system that renders communications or stored data useless to spies and thieves.

Is active defense only an information security concept?

Not at all. Some argue that it dates back to The Art of War, in which Sun Tzu wrote, “Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.” Centuries later Mao Zedong said, “The only real defense is active defense,” equating it to the destruction of an enemy’s ability to attack — much as aggressive tactics in active cyber defense aim to do. The term was applied in the Cold War and, as Denning and Strawser’s paper makes clear, is a core concept in air missile defense. Tactics are tactics; all that changes is where they’re employed.

That seems pretty straightforward. So why the uncertainty around the definition?

As noted earlier, hacking back — also not a new term — has confused matters. Properly used, it refers to efforts to attack your attackers on their turf. But because people often fuse it with active defense, difficult and sometimes frustrating disputes over the merits of active defense have ensued. One research paper went so far as to equate the two terms, starting its definition, “Hack back — sometimes termed ‘active defense’…”

The confusion multiplied in October 2017, when Representatives Tom Graves (R-GA) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) introduced the Active Cyber Defense Certainty (ACDC) bill, which would allow companies to gain unauthorized access to computers in some situations in order to disrupt attacks. The lawmakers called this active defense. The media called it the “hack back bill.” What it would and would not allow became the subject of hot debate. The idea that companies could go into other people’s infected computers wasn’t welcomed. Some savaged the bill. The technology blog network Engadget called it “smarmy and conceited” and observed, “When you try to make laws about hacking based on a child’s concept of ‘getting someone back,’ you’re getting very far and away from making yourself secure. It’s like trying to make gang warfare productive.” The bill went through two iterations and is currently stalled.

But is hacking back part of active defense?

Probably not. Lee says unequivocally, “Hacking back is absolutely not active defense. It’s probably illegal, and it’s probably not effective. We don’t have evidence that attacking attackers works.” Denning has a somewhat different take. “Hacking back is just one form of active defense,” she says. “It might be used to gather intelligence about the source of an intrusion to determine attribution or what data might have been stolen. If the attacker is identified, law enforcement might bring charges. If stolen data is found on the intruder’s system, it might be deleted. Hacking back might also involve neutralizing or shutting down an attacking system so that it cannot cause further damage.”

But Lee and Denning are defining the term differently. And Denning’s version refers to actions undertaken with proper authority by government entities. When it comes to hacking back on the part of businesses, the two experts are in total agreement: Don’t do it. Denning says, “Companies should not hack back. The Department of Justice has advised victims of cyberattacks to refrain from any ‘attempt to access, damage, or impair another system that may appear to be involved in the intrusion or attack.’ The advice contends that ‘doing so is likely illegal, under U.S. and some foreign laws, and could result in civil and/or criminal liability.’”

What’s an example of an aggressive form of active defense that some might consider hacking back?

Denning says, “One of my favorite examples of active defense led to the exposure of a Russian hacker who had gotten malicious code onto government computers in the country of Georgia. The malware searched for documents using keywords such as “USA” and “NATO,” which it then uploaded to a drop server used by the hacker. The Georgian government responded by planting spyware in a file named “Georgian-NATO Agreement” on one of its compromised machines. The hacker’s malware dutifully found and uploaded the file to the drop server, which the hacker then downloaded to his own machine. The spyware turned on the hacker’s webcam and sent incriminating files along with a snapshot of his face back to the Georgian government.

Is that hacking back? I don’t think so. It was really through the hacker’s own code and actions that he ended up with spyware on his computer.”

Note that the actions were taken by a government and occurred within its “borders”; Georgia put the spyware on its own computer. It did not traverse a network to hit another system. It was the hacker’s action of illegally taking the file that triggered the surveillance.

If it’s probably illegal and ineffective, why is hacking back getting so much press?

Companies are weary. “They are under constant attack and working so hard and spending so much just to keep up, and they can’t keep up,” Lee says. “This is a moment when we’re looking for new ideas. That’s why Bochman’s concept of unplugging systems and not always going right to the most efficient solution is starting to be heard. Hacking back feels like another way to turn the tide. Cybersecurity loves a silver bullet, and this feels like one. CEOs are probably thinking, ‘Nothing else has worked; let’s fight.’” Lee has heard many business leaders express these sentiments, especially if their companies have suffered damaging attacks. “This is an emotional issue,” he says. “You feel violated, and you want to do something about it.”

In a paper titled “Ethics of Hacking Back,” Cal Poly’s Patrick Lin captures the sense of utter vulnerability that could lead some to desire vigilante justice:

In cybersecurity, there’s a certain sense of helplessness — you are mostly on your own. You are often the first and last line of defense for your information and communications technologies; there is no equivalent of state-protected borders, neighborhood police patrols, and other public protections in cyberspace.

For instance, if your computer were hit by “ransomware” — malware that locks up your system until you pay a fee to extortionists — law enforcement would likely be unable to help you. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offers this guidance: “To be honest, we often advise people to just pay the ransom,” according to Joseph Bonavolonta, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s CYBER and Counterintelligence Program.

Do not expect a digital cavalry to come to your rescue in time. As online life moves at digital speeds, law enforcement and state responses are often too slow to protect, prosecute, or deter cyberattackers. To be sure, some prosecutions are happening but inconsistently and slowly. The major cases that make headlines are conspicuously unresolved, even if authorities confidently say they know who did them.

What are the ethics of hacking back?

For the most part, experts say that hacking back without legal authorization or government cooperation is unethical. And whenever activities leave your boundaries, it’s hard to condone them. The targets are too evasive, and the networks are too complex, traversing innocent systems and affecting the people working with them. In addition, Lee points out that government entities might be tracking and dealing with malicious actors, and hacking back could compromise their operations. “Leave it to the pros,” he says.

Denning stresses that unintended consequences are not just possible but likely. She says, “The biggest risks come when you start messing with someone else’s computers. Many cyberattacks are launched through intermediary machines that were previously compromised by the attacker. Those computers could be anywhere, even in a hospital or power plant. So you don’t want to shut them down or cause them to malfunction.”

What kind of work is under way with regard to ethics?

According to Denning, researchers began wrestling with these issues as early as 2006. Speaking about a workshop she participated in, she says, “I recall discussions about measures that involved tracing back through a series of compromised machines to find the origin of an attack. Such tracebacks would involve hacking into the compromised machines to get their logs if the owners were not willing or could not be trusted to help out.”

A decade later Denning collaborated with Strawser to examine the morality of active defense writ large, using the ethics of air defense and general war doctrine as a guide. They wrote that harm to “non-combatants” — especially and most obviously physical harm — disqualifies an active defense strategy. But they say that “temporary harm to the property of non-combatants” is sometimes morally permissible. (It should be noted Denning is primarily focused on the government use of active cyber defense strategies). Denning cites the takedown of Coreflood — malware that infected millions of computers and was used as a botnet. The Justice Department won approval to seize the botnet by taking over its command-and-control servers. Then, when the bots contacted the servers for instructions, the response was essentially, “Stop operating.” In the instance of Coreflood, as in some similar cases, a judge decided that the actions could proceed because they could shut down major malicious code without damaging the infected systems or accessing any information on them.

“The effect was simply to stop the bot code from running. No other functions were affected, and the infected computers continued to operate normally,” Denning says. “There was virtually no risk of causing any harm whatsoever, let alone serious harm.”

Still, the case may have set a precedent for at least the suggestion of more-aggressive measures, such as the ACDC bill. If the government can take control of command-and-control servers, it can, in theory, do more than just tell the bots to shut down. Why not grab some log files at the same time? Or turn on the webcam, as in the Georgian-NATO case? Oversight is needed in all active defense strategies.

How can I deploy an ethical and effective active defense strategy?

If you have or subscribe to services that can thwart DDoS attacks and create logs, you’ve already started. Denning says that many companies are doing more active defense than they realize. “They might not call it active defense, but what they call it matters less than what they do.”

Cooperating with law enforcement and the international network of companies and organizations combating hacking is also part of an active defense strategy. The more companies and agencies that work together, the more likely it is that active defense strategies like the one that took out Coreflood can be executed without harm. Several such operations have taken place without reports of problems.

Denning recommends A Data-Driven Computer Security Defense: THE Computer Security Defense You Should Be Using, by Roger A. Grimes. (Full disclosure: Denning wrote the foreword. “But the book really is good!” she says.)

As for more-aggressive tactics, like the ones proposed in the ACDC bill, proceed with caution. Work with law enforcement and other government agencies, and understand the risks. Denning says, “It’s all about risk. Companies need to understand the threats and vulnerabilities and how security incidents will impact their company, customers, and partners. Then they need to select cost-effective security defenses, both passive and active.” There are limits, she cautions. “Security is a bottomless pit; you can only do so much. But it’s important to do the right things — the things that will make a difference.”THEBIG IDEA

About the author: Scott Berinato is a senior editor at Harvard Business Reviewand the author of Good Charts: The HBR Guide to Making Smarter, More Persuasive Data Visualizations.